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INTRODUCTION 
The claim that legal disputes have no determinate answer is an old one. 
The worry is one that assails every first-year law student at some point. 
Having learned to argue both sides of every case, the feeling seems 
inevitable. 
But to assess the “skeptical thesis,” which is what I will hereafter call this 
claim, in its strongest version, we will do well to look at a particularly 
vigorous presentation of it, which, in the case of criminal law, is to be found 
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in Mark Kelman’s justly famous Interpretive Constructs in the Criminal Law.1 
What caught people’s imagination about Kelman’s article were, I think, two 
features: on the one hand, there was the sheer virtuosity with which Kelman 
presented each side of a series of cases making up the standard criminal law 
curriculum; but, secondly, and probably more importantly, there were the 
patterns he was able to discern in the arguments being made—the recurrent 
themes, tropes, moves, and perspectives being employed by each side. These 
two aspects of the article imbued Kelman’s presentation of the skeptical 
thesis with particular zest. The skillful presentation of each side of the 
argument in cases that he did not especially select for the purpose, along 
with the suggestion that such arguments could be cooked up, almost as by 
recipe, using the themes, tropes, moves, and perspectives he identified, 
made the conclusion that legal doctrine really does not settle any dispute, or 
at least any dispute of consequence, almost irresistible. Something else, 
most likely the whims of the judges, must be the real determinants of the 
outcome. 
Much of the force of Kelman’s argument thus comes from his particular 
examples. So let us take a look at several of those. 
1. Kelman argues for the indeterminacy of the voluntariness requirement 
in criminal law, with the help of the case of Martin v. State.2 Martin was 
arrested and dragged out onto the street. He was drunk and he proceeded to 
make a nuisance of himself. He was charged under a statute punishing 
“[a]ny person who, while intoxicated or drunk, appears in any public place 
where one or more persons are present, . . . and manifests a drunken 
condition by boisterous or indecent conduct, or loud and profane 
discourse.”3 Basic criminal law doctrine only permits someone to be 
convicted of a crime if he performed a voluntary act.4 The defendant argued 
that inasmuch as he “appeared in public” by being carried there by the 
police, he did not perform the requisite voluntary act.5 Contrariwise, it 
could be of course argued that he met the voluntary act requirement 
inasmuch as he performed some sort of voluntary act that induced someone 
to call for the police to come and arrest him, and that he performed a 
further voluntary act when he behaved in a “boisterous or indecent” fashion 
once he had been brought onto the public highway.6 Which of these 
 
1 See generally Mark Kelman, Interpretive Constructs in the Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591 
(1981). 
2 17 So. 2d 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944). 
3 Id. (quoting ALA. CODE § 14-120 (1940)). 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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perspectives will prevail depends, as Kelman sees it, on what he calls 
“time-framing.”7 If we focus narrowly on what was going on with the 
defendant at the moment that he first appeared in public, being carried 
there by the police, his violation of the statute looks involuntary. If we focus 
more broadly on the conduct preceding his arrest and on the conduct 
following it, it starts to look voluntary. Which of these perspectives we 
choose seems to Kelman an arbitrary matter. The court opted for the 
involuntary perspective, but, as he sees it, could just as easily have gone the 
other way. 
2. Kelman argues for the indeterminacy of the widely accepted precept 
that we should eschew strict liability in the criminal law, by pointing out 
that whether a given crime is one of strict liability is entirely 
indeterminate.8 When the head of a pharmaceutical company is held liable 
for letting mislabeled or contaminated drugs be sold, despite the fact that 
he was neither reckless nor negligent, that looks like an intolerable instance 
of strict liability, superficially serving neither the ends of deterrence nor 
retribution. That is the perspective that focuses “narrowly,” as Kelman sees 
it, on what the defendant was doing at around the time that these defective 
products were being shipped. But if we consider the actions he took much 
before that, the decision to enter into this line of business and to run the 
business in the manner that he did, liability no longer seems so strict and so 
unfair. There are a number of actions he could have taken along the way to 
avert liability, including not getting into this line of business in the first 
place. Nor is it so clear any longer that deterrence would not be in fact 
improved by a regime of such very expansive liability. Even the demands of 
retribution might be satisfied once one focuses on the fact that, by getting 
into this business, the defendant voluntarily undertook the risk of being 
held liable if something went wrong. 
3. Kelman argues that whether a defendant obtained the free and 
knowing consent of his partner when he had intercourse with her, or did 
some other action deemed impermissible without such consent, will also 
often be a matter of time-framing.9 Focus on the moment at which she said 
yes, and the conduct looks consensual. Focus more broadly on her 
vacillating feelings before and after she said yes, and the actuality of her 
consent starts to seem more uncertain. If in addition, you pay attention to 
the fact that there surely are some things about the person she is having 
intercourse with and about the repercussions of doing so that were unknown 
 
7 Kelman, supra note 1, at 593. 
8 Id. at 605. 
9 Id. at 614. 
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to her, we face the problem of whether she was informed enough for the 
consent not to falter on that ground alone. And what of the deleterious 
consequences she might have feared if she did not sleep with him? It would 
not be hard to think of those, Kelman suggests, as constraints that render 
her consent not truly “free.”10  
4. Kelman argues that whether an attempt qualifies as “legal[ly] 
impossible” (and hence should not result in liability) or “factually 
impossible” is entirely indeterminate.11 Consider F, who goes hunting in 
September thinking that it is October, a month during which hunting is 
illegal under the governing statute. Compare L, who goes hunting in 
September, erroneously thinking that the governing statute bans hunting in 
September, whereas in fact it covers only October. One might at first glance 
think F is guilty of attempting to violate the hunting statute—his case being 
categorized as one of “factual impossibility.” Similarly, one might at first 
glance think that L is not guilty of attempting to violate the hunting 
statute—his case being categorized as one of “legal impossibility.” But, 
Kelman argues, one can just as easily argue both to be instances of factual or 
legal impossibility. It is not hard to think of F’s mistake as being a mistake 
about law (is the current month one during which the law bans hunting?), or 
of L’s mistake about what the statute prohibits as really being factual (the 
fact in question being to which month the law happens to refer).  
5. Kelman argues that whether the so-called “concurrence doctrine” is 
satisfied is highly indeterminate.12 Consider the classic case of one 
Cunningham, who rips a gas meter out of a basement wall of a duplex 
building, so as to appropriate the coins that have been deposited in it.13 
(This used to be the way to pay for gas.) By doing so, he ended up releasing 
toxic fumes into the adjacent unit, poisoning and nearly killing its 
inhabitant.14 He was charged with poisoning his victim with malice 
aforethought, construed to mean poisoning her either intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly.15 Was he guilty? The court held not, under the 
criminal law’s concurrence doctrine, which states that if the defendant 
commits a crime whose mens rea does not “concur” with the actus reus he 
actually committed, in other words whatever crime he thought he was 
committing, he was not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly committing 
 
10 Id. at 594.  
11 Id. at 670. 
12 Id. at 633. 
13 R v. Cunningham, [1957] 2 Q.B. 396 at 398 (Ct. Crim. App.) (Eng.). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 399-400.  
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that crime and cannot be held liable.16 Obviously Cunningham did not 
actually intend to harm anyone (other than the gas company), or even think 
he was risking such harm.17 He had no inkling that ripping out the gas 
meter would unleash such fumes. 
That is one way to look at the matter. Another way to look at it, Kelman 
points out, is to note that recklessness is customarily defined as the 
imposition of an unjustified risk, and that the risk Cunningham imposed on 
the inhabitant of the neighboring unit was surely unjustified, since he 
imposed it for the sake of stealing something. Looked at in this way, the 
concurrence requirement is met.  
6. Kelman argues that whether someone voluntarily abandoned an 
attempt and therefore qualifies for the abandonment defense is indeterminate.18 
For someone’s abandonment of an attempt to count as voluntary it has to 
occur  
under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of 
his criminal purpose. . . . [R]enunciation of criminal purpose is not 
voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not 
present or apparent at the inception of the actor’s course of conduct, that 
increase the probability of detection or apprehension or that make more 
difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not 
complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct 
until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another 
but similar objective or victim.19  
What now of someone who postpones a bank robbery because he sees a 
policeman? It seems that would be clearly involuntary. What if he does so 
because he learns there is a special alarm system? What if he learns there are 
alarm systems? What if he learns there are hard-to-break safes? What if he 
learns there is jail time to serve if he gets caught? There is, Kelman argues, 
no principled difference between these cases. In all of them, the 
renunciation only occurs on account of some threatened unfortunate 
consequence for the perpetrator. The law cannot really justify by the 
articulated criteria the answer that would typically be given, which is to 
exonerate in the last case and convict in the first, let alone the unpredictable 
answers that would be given in the rest of the cases.  
 
16 Kelman, supra note 1, at 633-34.  
17 See id. at 633 (“The court refused to transfer the requisite mental state from the 
defendant’s attempt to steal coins to the poisoning.”).  
18 Id. at 644.  
19 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1962). 
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7. Kelman argues that whether someone who recklessly surmises that he 
is being attacked and acts in mistaken self-defense should be treated as an 
intentional or reckless killer is wholly indeterminate.20 Such a defendant 
does kill intentionally. That suggests what he did should be thought of as a 
regular murder. On the other hand, he acted under the admittedly reckless 
belief that he was under attack. That makes it appear as though he was 
really just being reckless. Which of those is the right perspective to take on 
the case is, according to Kelman, wholly indeterminate. 
8. Kelman argues that whether attempt law should recognize the 
abandonment defense is indeterminate. On the one hand, it seems 
tempting, both from the point of view of deterrence and retribution, to 
recognize that someone who has attempted a crime but changes his mind 
before completing it (and does so voluntarily) deserves to be exonerated. 
On the other hand, we don’t really “frame” things that way elsewhere in the 
law. Ordinarily, we take the view that if someone has committed a crime, 
even if he later tries to reverse course, he is guilty of that crime. At most, it 
might serve him in mitigation, that he tried to, say, return the money he 
stole. Why are things different with attempts? 
9. Kelman argues that whether someone meets the mens rea 
requirement for complicity by intentionally aiding and abetting someone 
else in committing a crime is very indeterminate.21 An undercover agent 
asked the defendant where he could buy some illegal drugs. The defendant 
referred him to a certain drug dealer. Is he an accomplice of the drug 
dealer? Is he intentionally assisting the drug dealer? The prosecution 
argued, yes, inasmuch as he was trying to help effectuate the sale. The 
defense argued, no, inasmuch as the drug seller did not at the time that this 
help was rendered intend to make such a sale; nor for that matter did he 
ever in the future do so, since the undercover agent did not contact him. 
10. Kelman argues that the distinction between acts and omissions is 
indeterminate.22 Is a doctor who unplugs an irreversibly comatose patient 
from a respirator killing or letting die? He is actively unplugging the 
equipment—that makes it look like an act of killing. On the other hand, by 
doing so, he is simply letting nature take its course. That makes it look like 
an omission. One could elaborate on each of those classifications, making 
what the doctor did alternately look more like an act or more like an 
omission. It is often argued, for instance, that the way to test whether we 
are dealing with an act or an omission is to ask what would have happened 
 
20 Kelman, supra note 1, at 616. 
21 Id. at 627. 
22 Id. at 637. 
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to the victim if the defendant had not existed. If the victim would have died 
anyway, we are dealing with an omission. The problem is that, in our 
medical case, one might say that if the doctor had not existed, he would not 
have been there to unplug the life support system and the victim would 
have continued to receive his treatment. That makes it look like an act. But 
one might also say that if the doctor did not exist, the victim would never 
have been hooked up to the life support system in the first place, and 
therefore would be dead. That makes it look like an omission.  
Is Kelman arguing that only hard cases are indeterminate? No, he 
suggests that even easy cases, looked at closely, turn out to be 
indeterminate. What does he make of the solutions courts purport to offer 
in these cases? They are make-believe. The cases could easily have come out 
differently, but the courts deceive themselves about that by semiconsciously 
or even unconsciously deleting the possible conceptual moves that would 
have allowed them to reach an alternative outcome. “One real conclusion,” 
from his article, he suggests, “one possible bottom line, is that I’ve 
constructed a very elaborate, schematized, and conceptual piece of winking 
dismissal: ‘Here’s what they say, this is how far they have gotten. You know 
what? There’s not much to it.’”23 
A minor clarification concerning Kelman’s thesis is in order. Something 
that some readers might find confusing in his presentation is what exactly 
Kelman means when he refers to indeterminate criminal law doctrines. It is 
often not clear in his examples whether he is referring to what outcome 
existing criminal codes dictate, or what decisional law implies, or what laws 
prevailing criminal law norms require us to pass. But it does not matter. All 
of the above are cases in which criminal law doctrine as customarily 
conceived, whether allowed to do its work at the lawmaking or the law-applying 
stage, should give determinate answers. If it does not, that is worrisome. 
In what follows, I am going to consider the skeptical thesis from a 
variety of perspectives, some of which undercut it, others of which do the 
reverse.  
I. TAKE 1: THE COGNITIVE THERAPY PERSPECTIVE 
One reason why the skeptical thesis finds such resonance is that it 
mirrors an experience we have in everyday life. Our feelings about whatever 
positive or negative encounters we have are quite indeterminate. It seems 
possible to think about nearly whatever happens to us in a positive or a 
negative light, about nearly every person who has interacted with us in a 
 
23 Id. at 672-73. 
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sympathetic or a hostile way. Cognitive therapy capitalizes on that. It 
teaches us how to turn a bad mood into a good mood by just using the right 
cognitive strategy for reframing the event that troubles us in a suitably 
uplifting way. This is nicely conveyed by the title of one of the books by 
Albert Ellis, the foremost practitioner of a variant of cognitive therapy 
called rational emotive therapy: How to Stubbornly Refuse to Make Yourself 
Miserable About Anything (Yes, Anything!).24  
Well, is that possible? Perhaps the most convincing example is offered by 
another cognitive therapy guru, David Burns, in the introduction to his 
book The Feeling Good Handbook: Using the New Mood Therapy in Everyday 
Life.25 He relates the following incident. When his son was born, the baby 
was having trouble breathing: “He was bluer than a healthy baby should be 
and he was wheezing and gasping for air.”26 It was recommended that he be 
put into an incubator in the premature intensive care unit.27 Not 
surprisingly, Burns panicked: 
[“]What if he ends up with brain damage or is mentally retarded?”  
As I walked through the hospital corridors, frightening thoughts raced 
through my mind. I developed tunnel vision and I felt as if I were floating 
across the ceiling. I had fantasies of taking him to clinics for the rest of his 
life as he struggled with various handicaps. As the night wore on, I was 
flooded with wave after wave of panic and I felt like a nervous wreck. 
Then I asked myself: “Why don’t you do what you tell your patients to 
do? Aren’t you always suggesting that distorted thoughts—and not realistic 
ones—upset people? Why don’t you write your negative thoughts down on a 
piece of paper and see if there’s something illogical about them?” Then I 
told myself, “Oh, that wouldn’t work because this problem is real! A silly 
paper and pencil exercise wouldn’t do me any good at all!” Then I countered 
this with “Why not try it as an experiment and find out?” 
The first thought I wrote down was “Other people might think less of 
me if I have a mentally retarded son.” I’m a little ashamed to admit that my 
own ego was already caught up with the accomplishments and intelligence 
of my own son. But that was how I was thinking! This is such a common 
trap. We’re programmed to believe that if we’re number one in athletics or 
scholastics or in our careers, then we’re no longer “average” or “ordinary” 
 
24 ALBERT ELLIS, HOW TO STUBBORNLY REFUSE TO MAKE YOURSELF MISERABLE 
ABOUT ANYTHING (YES, ANYTHING!) (1988).  
25 DAVID D. BURNS, THE FEELING GOOD HANDBOOK: USING THE NEW MOOD 
THERAPY IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1989). 
26 Id. at xvi. 
27 Id. 
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but “special.” Our children incorporate this value system as they grow up 
and their feelings of self-esteem get connected with how talented, 
successful, or popular they are. 
Once I wrote my negative thoughts down and thought about it, I began 
to see how distorted and unloving it was and I decided to look at it this way 
instead: “It’s not very likely that people will evaluate me based on how 
intelligent my son is. They’re more likely to evaluate me on what I do. 
Their feelings about me will depend more on how I treat them and how I 
feel about them than on my own or my son’s success.” 
The more I thought about it, the clearer it became that my own feelings 
of happiness and my love for my son didn’t have to be connected with his 
intelligence or career at all. And then a rather sweet realization came to 
mind. It dawned on me that even if he was only average or below average, it 
didn’t need to diminish the joy we would share by one iota. I thought of 
how wonderful it would be to be close to him and to do things together as 
he grew up. I had the fantasy of going into the coin-collecting business with 
him when I was old and ready to retire from psychiatry. I had always had an 
interest in coin collecting, and my daughter, who was five years old at the 
time, was quite bright and independent. She had always developed her own 
interests and hobbies and never had much interest in coins. The fantasy of 
going to coin shows with my son and wheeling and dealing Lincoln pennies 
and buffalo nickels was so exciting that my anxiety vanished entirely.28 
Some readers will be tempted to conclude that what Burns has done is 
prove that the right way to think about his son’s predicament is not to get 
too upset about it, for just the reasons he gave to himself to “un-upset” 
himself. Burns’s reference to distorted thinking certainly supports that idea. 
It makes it appear as though what he has done by changing his perspective 
is to set things right, to find a way of thinking about his problem that is 
more appropriate than the panic-stricken way in which he started out. But I 
think that is too hasty. For in the same spirit that Burns found a perspective 
that made the problem look less alarming, we could find a perspective that 
reverses things yet again. We might try arguing somewhat as follows:  
Gee, if it isn’t all that bad if the baby were to suffer some brain damage as a 
result of the birth, because his father and he himself would not be hindered 
from still having a pretty happy life, then consider the question we would 
face if we had to ask ourselves how much effort and expense ought to be 
shouldered to avert that contingency, in other words, the kind of weighing 
 
28 Id. at xvi-xvii; see also Leo Katz, Before and After: Temporal Anomalies in Legal Doctrine, 151 
U. PA. L. REV. 863, 866-67 (2003).  
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of costs and benefits we have to engage in under the negligence standard 
when we decide what kind of care and precaution is appropriate under what 
circumstances. Might we not conclude that we do not really have to try too 
hard to avert such a calamity because we have just concluded that it is not 
such a calamity after all?  
Now, of course no one would agree with that. And doesn’t that demonstrate 
that in fact it is much more of a calamity than Burns’s perspective led us to 
conclude? 
Perhaps you are now inclined to conclude that what this proves is that 
Burns was mistaken, benignly self-deluded. The so-called distorted 
perspective was not distorted, but correct, and that attempt to un-distort it 
is what went awry. But I don’t think so. I think there are quite persuasive 
replies available to the argument I just produced. One simply needs to start 
thinking about those well-known experiments involving quadriplegics who 
are just as happy or nearly as happy as people who did not suffer such an 
accident, to restore one’s faith in Burns’s original argument. 
To be sure, there are counterarguments available to that in turn. For 
instance, the fact that the proverbial quadriplegics, though perhaps nearly as 
happy as they were before they had their accident, would probably be 
willing to spend exorbitant sums, and make all kinds of other sacrifices, just 
to regain their mobility. 
It would seem as though this rhetorical game could go on indefinitely. 
And since it seems as though it is essentially the same kind of game we are 
playing in law, specifically that we are playing with regard to the 
controversies sketched out by Kelman, law does indeed look as hopelessly 
indeterminate as common sense reasoning proves to be in the skillful hands 
of a good cognitive therapist. 
II. TAKE 2: THE MORAL INSTINCT PERSPECTIVE 
 Noam Chomsky famously proposed that we all have a “language 
instinct,” an innate capacity to learn language that we are born with and 
that largely relieves us of the need to do a lot of learning in order to be able 
to speak.29 For the most part, the capacity to speak a language is ready-made 
within us, and only a few external tweaks are required to call forth its actual 
expression and to determine whether its actual expression will result in our 
speaking German, Japanese, or English. The most dramatic demonstration 
of this capacity is our ability to tell whether a given agglomeration of words 
 
29 See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE (1975). 
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uttered by someone in “our” language is grammatical or not. We are able to 
do this effortlessly for an infinite variety of sentences, none of which we 
have ever before been exposed to and taught to recognize as being 
grammatical. We are able to do so because we are born with an innate 
knowledge of the rules of grammar. Most of those rules are what linguists 
call operative principles rather than express principles.30 We rely on them 
when classifying an utterance as grammatical or not, but could not actually 
articulate them—although linguists have gone a long way toward making 
these operative, but unconscious, principles express. 
Lately, a number of psychologists, philosophers and at least one 
prominent legal theorist, John Mikhail, have argued that it is similar with 
our ability to make moral judgments.31 We are born with a set of innate 
moral principles, which we do not need to be taught but know how to apply 
automatically.32 Many of them are merely “operative”: we rely on them 
without being able to spell them out.33 We are able to use them without 
being conscious of what they require.34 But with time and effort we are 
often able to figure out what they are.35 Indeed a lot of legal doctrine 
consists of doing just that—making these unconscious operative principles 
express.36 
If this is right, and I find it very plausible, then it suggests that we will 
in many cases involving these principles have a false sense of indeterminacy. 
We will have an intuition about how a case should be decided, without being 
able to articulate the principle on which we are relying. And being unable to 
articulate the principle, we may feel less constrained by our raw, free-floating 
intuition. A good example of this kind is the first of the Kelman cases I 
presented above, Martin v. State.37 
In discussing Martin, Kelman contrasts it with another well-known case, 
People v. Decina,38 involving an epileptic driver who has a seizure while 
 
30 JOHN MIKHAIL, ELEMENTS OF MORAL COGNITION: RAWLS’ LINGUISTIC 
ANALOGY AND THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORAL AND LEGAL JUDGMENT 19-21 (2011). 
31 See id. (“[A] person’s operative moral principles are those principles that are actually 
operative in her exercise of moral judgment . . . . [A] person’s express moral principles are those 
statements that a person verbalizes in the attempt to describe, explain, or justify her judgments.”). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 17 So. 2d 427, 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1944) (concluding that, when police officers arrested the 
defendant for public exhibition of a drunken condition after forcibly removing him from his home 
to a public highway, an involuntary act cannot give rise to liability).  
38 138 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1956).  
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driving and loses control of his car, killing four children.39 In Decina, the 
court did not say that because the defendant’s conduct during the seizure 
was involuntary he should be acquitted. Instead, the court focused on the 
fact that he made a voluntary decision to drive, and concluded that that 
satisfied the voluntariness requirement.40 Something perfectly analogous 
could have been done in Martin, Kelman argues.41 And correspondingly, if 
the court had been willing to engage in the same kind of “narrow time-framing” 
in Decina that the court engaged in in Martin, it would have been led to 
acquit Decina. It is this which makes Kelman conclude that the outcome in 
the Martin case is completely indeterminate, and that the court capriciously 
settled on one outcome rather than the other, on an acquittal rather than a 
conviction, when it could just as easily have gone the other way. 
Michael Moore has taken Kelman to task for being confused about how 
the voluntariness requirement operates. In his mind, the outcomes in both 
Martin and Decina are determinate and not the least bit inconsistent: 
If there were a ‘time-framing’ choice to be made in criminal cases, Kelman 
is right in his observation that there would be no principled way to make it. 
But where did Kelman get his assumption that there is such a choice to be 
made? . . . [If] the court can find a voluntary act by the defendant, 
accompanied at that time by whatever culpable mens rea that is required, 
which act in fact and proximately causes some legally prohibited state of 
affairs, then the defendant is prima facie liable for that legal harm. There is 
no ‘time-framing’ choice here. If there is any point in time where the act 
and mens rea requirements are simultaneously satisfied, and from which the 
requisite causal relations exist to some legally prohibited state of affairs, 
then the defendant is prima facie liable. . . . 
. . . Kelman thinks that the Alabama court [in Martin] could justify its 
decision (of no voluntary act by Martin) only by a ‘narrow time-framing’; 
for a broad time-framing would reveal earlier acts by Martin that were 
voluntary . . . . What Kelman overlooks is that those earlier acts by Martin 
were not the proximate cause of his being drunk in public. The police 
officers’ intentional placing of Martin in a public place constitutes an 
intervening cause on anyone’s reading of that notion, making Martin not a 
proximate cause of the legally prohibited state of affairs. In addition, had 
the [Martin] statute required any mens rea with respect to the element of 
public place, as it should have, Martin’s earlier acts of drinking in his home 
 
39 Id. at 800-01. 
40 Id. at 803-04. 
41 See Kelman, supra note 1, at 603 (“[T]he defendant in Martin, as well, may have done 
something voluntarily . . . .”).  
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were unaccompanied by such mens rea and were thus ineligible to be the 
basis for his conviction for that reason too.42 
Moore is explaining that, once one construes the voluntariness 
requirement as meaning that the defendant is guilty if and only if one can 
find a moment in time in which his conduct could be described as falling 
within the statute and in which such conduct was voluntary, he can be held 
liable. In Martin, such a moment could not be found. The voluntary actions 
preceding Martin’s appearance in public did not constitute an “appearance”; 
they simply caused such an appearance later on. By contrast, Decina’s 
starting to drive, knowing he was prone to seizures, constituted dangerous 
driving within the meaning of that statute, as well as being a voluntary act, 
since he was not at that moment having a seizure. 
I think Moore is half right and half wrong. He is right insofar as he 
correctly, I think, analyzes how the voluntariness requirement ought to 
operate. And if it is applied in that fashion, the time-framing indeterminacy 
Kelman identifies disappears. He is wrong, however, in suggesting that this 
is something everybody has always understood and Kelman alone 
misunderstood. I think what Moore managed to do is to identify an 
operative, but never previously expressed, principle that silently operates to 
fill out the meaning of the voluntariness requirement. He is therefore right 
to argue that there is in truth not much of an indeterminacy here, although 
someone who does not see the principle that Moore sees might well 
conclude that there is, if he is disturbed enough not to trust his intuition 
about the case and insist that only intuition fortified by the principle that 
lurks behind it is to be followed.  
Yet another of Kelman’s examples that may qualify as such a case of 
pseudo-indeterminacy is the case of the man who steals a gas meter, which 
unleashes a cloud of gas that nearly asphyxiates the inhabitant of a nearby 
dwelling. He did not anticipate that this would happen. Can he be found to 
have been reckless? A literal-minded application of the usual formulation of 
the recklessness standard, as Kelman rightly points out, would result in a 
conviction, since he imposed a substantial and unjustified risk.43 This is so 
not because the risk was particularly high, but because he acted without a 
trace of a justification: he imposed the risk for the sake of carrying out an 
antisocial act, the theft of the gas meter. But we would in fact be reluctant 
to declare that someone who precipitated any harm whatsoever in the course 
 
42 MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW 35-37 (1993) (citations omitted). 
43 Kelman, supra note 1, at 634.  
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of committing some collateral crime acted recklessly. In so doing, we are 
relying on some operative but hitherto unexpressed principle that tells us 
that this is the right outcome, a principle which in the law and economics 
literature is expressed as the activity level–care level distinction.44 I think 
that quite a few of Kelman’s other examples would qualify as such instances 
of pseudo-indeterminacy. 
Indeed, I believe there are many more such cases of pseudo-indeterminacy 
throughout the law. Saul Levmore, in an extraordinary article some decades 
ago, identified the similarly hidden principles in corporate tax law that 
determine outcomes we are hard-pressed to explain—until, that is, Levmore 
came along to tell us how it is to be done.45 Suppose that A and B are 50% 
shareholders in a corporation. The corporation pays out $500,000 to A 
alone; nothing to B. How is one to characterize, for tax purposes, what went 
on here—as a dividend to A, as salary to A, or as a gift to A? What about 
characterizing it in even weirder ways: as a gift of $700,000 to A, followed 
by a gift back from A to B of $200,000? He identifies several hidden rules by 
which courts choose among these various possibilities. The first is what he 
calls the “principle of completeness”:  
A “complete” recharacterization is one with components that explain all 
available data without contradicting reality. . . . [A]ssume that A and B are 
each 50% shareholders of a corporation that pays money to A alone. 
Completeness might be satisfied by a claim that this payment to A was a 
salary, especially if A planned to work for the corporation. Completeness 
would not be satisfied, however, by a claim that there was a redemption of 
A’s shares alone. So long as A and B continue to enjoy equal voting power, 
there will be evidence contradicting the claim that only A’s shares were 
redeemed.46 
A second principle is that of “consistency”: “A ‘consistent’ 
recharacterization does not contradict another recharacterization or ordering 
that is deemed acceptable by the tax system. For example, if A is taxed as 
having received compensation from the corporation, then it would be 
inconsistent to deny the corporation a deduction for that payment if it is 
reasonable.”47 
A third principle Levmore identifies is “directness”: 
 
44 Steven Shavell, Liability for Accidents, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 143-
47 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). 
45 Saul Levmore, Recharacterizations and the Nature of Theory in Corporate Tax Law, 136 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1019 (1988). 
46 Id. at 1020. 
47 Id. 
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A “direct” recharacterization is one that does not overshoot and then return 
to its mark. An itinerary that takes a traveler from New York to Chicago by 
way of Seattle is quintessentially indirect. Similarly, it would be indirect to 
describe A, . . . in the earlier example, as first having received an amount 
larger than she now really enjoys and then returning the difference to the 
corporation as a gift.48 
A particularly noteworthy feature of these rules is that they do not really 
reflect any policy. That is because many features of a well-designed tax 
system, while being neither “unfair [n]or inefficient,” are nonetheless 
inherently “arbitrary.”49 Inasmuch as they are arbitrary, “it is virtually 
impossible to develop normative arguments about questions that arise as a 
result or in the shadow of these basic starting points. The nature of 
corporate tax law often defies normative argumentation.”50 But that does not 
render these rules indeterminate. Instead the courts have resort to these 
extremely steadying and persuasive “hidden” principles. Much like the 
hidden linguistic rules uncovered by linguists, the hidden moral rules John 
Mikhail claims suffuse all of law.51  
III. TAKE 3: THE CORE–PENUMBRA PERSPECTIVE 
Lawyers are inclined to think that a great deal of indeterminacy 
emanates from the need to draw a line along a perfect continuum with no 
natural breaks. The consent problem that Kelman presents might be the 
clearest instance of this kind of case. One can think of a continuum of cases 
in which someone assents to an act which would be an impermissible harm 
if carried out without consent (e.g., intercourse) yet is unobjectionable if 
carried out with consent. Such consent, however, needs to be free and 
informed to be valid. Since one can easily picture varying degrees of 
information and misinformation, as well as varying degrees of freedom and 
coercion, the cases seem to arrange themselves along some kind of 
continuum, from perfectly free and perfectly informed to strongly coerced 
and very ill-informed.  
Somewhere on that continuum we let a judge draw a line to declare that 
on one side of the line consent is lacking and on the other it is not. Because 
there is little guidance on where exactly that line is to be drawn, there is a 
sense of indeterminacy. H. L. A. Hart conveyed this same idea by speaking 
 
48 Id. at 1021. 
49 Id. at 1062.  
50 Id.  
51 See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text. 
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of the core of a rule, surrounded by a penumbra of vagueness.52 And since 
the boundary between core and penumbra is itself somewhat penumbrous—
one might call it a meta-penumbra—and the boundary between meta-penumbra 
and core is penumbrous as well, one is left with a sense that there may be no 
easy cases—that even the darkest part of the core, on closer scrutiny, turns 
out to be more penumbra than core, which is what Kelman repeatedly 
suggests.53 
Still, many people—although not Kelman, I suspect—actually feel that 
this kind of indeterminacy is not all that worrisome. They think this because 
they see indeterminacy as an artifact of the law’s habit of treating an 
attribute as binary that is really scalar, and of insisting on drawing a line 
where there is really a continuum. Exactly where that line is drawn is not all 
that consequential so long as it is drawn within the penumbral region.54  
But there is reason to think that the penumbra picture is incorrect. The 
law’s attempt to draw a line is not merely an effort to impose an unnatural 
boundary where there is really a continuous spectrum. Instead, there is good 
reason to think that what the law is replicating is a sharp line that exists in 
the underlying reality. This is rather counterintuitive, and yet likely to be 
true. To see how and why, a slight digression is in order into one area where 
this seems particularly implausible and yet can rather convincingly be shown 
to be the case. 
The digression I have in mind will take us into John Broome’s 
exploration of population ethics in his book Weighing Lives.55 Consider the 
following question with which the book is preoccupied: would it be 
desirable to add an extra person to an existing population—would it be 
desirable if a particular set of parents had another child?56 That would 
presumably depend on how well off that child would be.  
Let us consider a number of possibilities. Suppose the child would be 
unrelievedly miserable, wracked by pain throughout its life. Then 
presumably it would make things worse if such a child were added to the 
existing population. Nothing complicated or puzzling so far. What about the 
opposite possibility? The child would be blissfully happy and successful for 
 
52 See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 
606-09 (1958).  
53 See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 1, at 661 (considering “whether the court believes that the core 
conduct described by [a] statute—conduct clearly fitting within its murky boundaries—is 
substantively innocent”). 
54 See generally Larry Alexander, Scalar Properties, Binary Judgments, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 85 
(2008) (illustrating how seemingly deontic judgments depend on factors with various gradations). 
55 JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING LIVES (2004).  
56 See id. at 143-45. 
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its entire life. Then we would probably be inclined to say it improves the 
world if this child were born. Well, maybe. Some people might say it 
neither improves the world nor makes it worse, but many would say it does 
improve things. What about the cases in between? About those, most people 
would say it makes no difference. In other words, whether a child whose 
happiness lies within some “normal” range would make the world a better 
place, the answer to that is it would not make a difference. Broome calls this 
the neutrality intuition.  
Here is Broome’s way of putting the matter:  
We think intuitively that adding a person to the world is very often 
ethically neutral. We do not think that just a single level of wellbeing is 
neutral, and that a person’s living at any other level is either better or worse 
than her nonexistence. . . .  
. . . .  
Suppose a couple are wondering whether to have a child. Suppose they 
decide their own lives will be better on balance if they remain childless, and 
because of that they remain so. Our intuition is that they are not acting 
wrongly. Moreover, it is not that we think the couple might have a reason to 
have a child, stemming from the child’s own wellbeing, but this reason can 
justifiably be outweighed by the couple’s own good. Instead, we think there 
is no positive reason at all why they should have a child. If having a child 
would be bad for the couple themselves, even to a small degree, it is right 
for them not to have one. 
There are limits to this intuition of neutrality. Suppose that, if this 
couple had a child, her life would be short and full of suffering. Then we 
think they should definitely not have a child. So existence at a poor level is 
not neutral; we are against it. Nevertheless, for a wide range of lives the 
child might live, having a child seems an ethically neutral matter.  
Some people think this range is infinitely wide. They think that a 
person’s existence is neutral, however good her life would be if she did exist. 
It is not neutral if her life would be bad, so there is a lower boundary to the 
neutral range. But there is no upper boundary. That is one view. A more 
moderate view is that the range has both an upper and a lower boundary, 
but there is nevertheless a range of neutral lives in between.57 
The neutrality intuition is widely embraced. Broome offers the 
following example for the “neutrality intuition at work”: 
 
57 Id. at 143-44. 
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Economists often concern themselves with setting a value on people’s lives. 
For example, they do cost-benefit analyses of projects that will improve 
safety on the roads or railways, where one of the benefits is the saving of 
lives. . . . Economists also advise on priorities in the health service: for 
example on priorities between the old and the young. . . . Both these 
problems are likely to involve the addition of people to the world. If a 
young person’s life is saved, she is likely to have children and grandchildren 
who would otherwise never have existed. . . . But when they make their 
judgements, economists never, or almost never, take account of these added 
people. Why not? The explanation has to be that they think their existence 
is ethically neutral.58 
Broome further notes that 
[t]he neutrality intuition is part of a broader way of thinking known as the 
‘person-affecting view’. This is the view that only benefits or harms that 
come to people can be ethically significant; a change must be ethically 
neutral unless it affects a person for good or ill. A change is neutral unless it 
makes someone either better or worse off than she would otherwise have 
been; that is the view. Now, a person’s coming into existence makes her 
neither better nor worse off than she would otherwise have been. It does not 
affect her for better or worse. So according to the person-affecting view, it is 
ethically neutral, unless it has some good or bad effects on other people. Jan 
Narveson says: ‘We are in favour of making people happy, but neutral about 
making happy people.’59 
There are many other reasons for embracing the intuition of neutrality. 
For instance, unless one embraces it, one ends up stuck with something 
known as the repugnant conclusion. One is driven to conclude that if given 
the choice between a population of the earth’s current size, with each person 
living at a level corresponding to that of the wealthiest person now on earth, 
and a population consisting of people just above the average level, the latter 
is preferable given there are enough of those people—that is a preferable 
state of affairs. That certainly seems implausible—indeed repugnant. 
There is thus much to be said for this neutrality intuition. And yet, if we 
embrace it, we end up with paradoxes.  
Consider the following possible population alternatives:  
Alternative A: the relevant world encompasses ten people, each with a 
welfare level of one unit. 
 
58 Id. at 144-45 (footnotes omitted). 
59 Id. at 145. 
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Alternative B: the relevant world encompasses (instead of the above) 
eleven people, each with a welfare level of one unit. 
Alternative C: the relevant world encompasses instead ten people with a 
welfare level of one unit, and an eleventh person with a welfare level of two 
units. 
When comparing these alternatives, under the neutrality intuition, B is 
no better than A. Adding an extra person in the “neutral” range is neutral—
in other words, it does not make the world better. 
Let us next compare B and C. Surely a world in which the eleventh 
person has two units of welfare and everybody else is as well off as they 
were before is better than one in which the eleventh person has only one 
unit of welfare. Therefore, C is better than B. 
Finally, let us compare A and C. Adding an extra person in the neutral 
range will not make the world better. Therefore, A and C are equal. But that 
leads to a contradiction, since C is better than B, which is equal with A. 
This is just the beginning of a larger welter of incoherencies that one is 
led to if one makes the assumption that there is a neutral range. The only 
way out of the incoherence is to conclude that there is no neutral range, only 
a neutral level, and anyone born above that level makes the world a better 
place and anyone born below it makes the world a worse place. 
The startling thing, however, is that we are in a state of what is 
sometimes called “non-epistemic uncertainty” about where that level is to 
be drawn. It is a binary distinction, which cannot be located except in a very 
rough and ready way. 
The same is probably true of most of the other uncertainties listed by 
Kelman.60 This helps account for a peculiar aspect of the way we perceive 
legal attributes. Typically, we vacillate between seeing the outcome of a 
certain case one way or another, similar to how we vacillate between seeing a 
Necker cube bulge inward or outward, or a rabbit–duck as a rabbit or a 
duck. This is not something one would expect with a scalar attribute. It is 
what one would expect of an attribute with a sharp discontinuity, whose 
dividing location is uncertain. 
IV. TAKE 4: THE SOCIAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 
One of the earliest insights of social choice theory was the fact that in 
making sense of the idea of a collective will many different options are 
available, each of which is somewhat plausible, but which lead to 
contradictory results. There are many plausible ways of aggregating the 
 
60 See supra notes 1-23 and accompanying text.  
  
1964 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1945 
 
wishes of a collectivity into something that can reasonably be regarded as 
being the collective wish of that collectivity. Different means of aggregation 
respect different principles, and depending on which of these competing 
principles one regards as most compelling, one arrives at one or another 
radically different outcome. It has since been realized that this lesson does 
not merely apply to collective decisionmaking, but also to multi-criterial 
decisionmaking. The paradoxes that plague the aggregation of individual 
preferences also plague the synthesis of many divergent criteria into one 
overall ranking and final decision.  
That makes such aggregation a promising model for legal 
decisionmaking. Legal decisionmaking is a particular kind of multi-criterial 
decisionmaking. When we consider what manner of criterial aggregation is 
most appealing, we have to choose between different competing principles 
of aggregation. Many are plausible, and the answer therefore has a 
familiarly indeterminate ring to it.  
Let me make all of this more concrete. Consider again the question 
whether F and L, each of whom goes hunting when they mistakenly believe 
it to be illegal, are guilty of attempting to violate the hunting law. F goes 
hunting in October erroneously thinking that it is September, when it is in 
fact illegal to hunt. L goes hunting in October erroneously thinking that 
this is a month during which the law forbids hunting, whereas it is the 
month of September during which hunting is forbidden, not October. An 
appealing symmetry principle would say that these two kinds of mistakes 
are about certain facts that are insignificantly different from each other—the 
fact of which month it is right now, and the fact of which month, September 
or October, is listed in the statute. A perceptible difference, but one that 
looks like it should not matter. But there is a competing symmetry principle 
that leads to treating the two cases differently from each other. Mistake 
questions don’t merely arise in the context of attempt law, but also 
completed offenses.  
Suppose we consider two cases which are twins of the two we have 
considered. Let us consider one involving F’, who goes hunting in 
September, when hunting is prohibited, but mistakenly thinks it is October. 
And consider also L’, who also goes hunting in September, when hunting is 
prohibited, but mistakenly thinks that hunting is allowed during that 
month. In both cases, the defendants think what they are doing is innocent, 
whereas objectively speaking, it is not. We would ordinarily acquit F’ 
because his mistake was factual. We would convict L’ because he is pleading 
ignorance of law, which ordinarily is no defense. Symmetry would suggest 
that if we do not allow ignorance of the law to exonerate L’, we should also 
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not allow it to serve to inculpate L, who mistakenly thinks that he is 
committing an illegal act when he is not. If law is irrelevant to the guilt of 
L’, it should also be irrelevant to the guilt of L. Correspondingly, if factual 
ignorance is permitted to exonerate F’, it only seems fair that it be 
permitted to inculpate F in the case in which he mistakenly thinks what he 
is doing is forbidden when it is not. The competition between symmetry 
principles is precisely what we have to deal with in the social choice context. 
And the indeterminacy that results is as tractable or intractable as it is in the 
social choice context. 
V. TAKE 5: THE ANALOGY PERSPECTIVE 
There is a reason lawyers are so fond of argument by analogy. It is a rich 
source of arguments when all other sources of argument seem to have dried 
up. It is a well that never dries up. Yet, it also provides more determinacy 
than is commonly appreciated. The work of Douglas Hofstadter is replete 
with demonstrations of this in various informal contexts. A nice example is 
his discussion of what in the analogy literature are called “Ob–Platte 
problems” in reference to a classic analogy problem involving those two 
rivers. Hofstadter explains that  
a shivering Siberian contemplating emigration to the Great Plains of the 
United States might worriedly inquire, “But what is the Ob of Nebraska?” 
Knowing, of course, that the Ob is the mighty river traversing Siberia, any 
red-blooded Nebraskan would proudly reply, “The Platte, of course!” 
Because of this classic example, such geographical analogy questions have 
traditionally been called “Ob–Platte puzzles” . . . .61 
An especially illuminating example of the power of analogical intuitions 
is Hofstadter and Robert French’s discussion of the following Ob–Platte 
puzzle: 
What is the East St. Louis of Illinois? 
Initially, this might sound either trivial or nonsensical, given that East 
St. Louis is in Illinois to begin with. However, the mere posing of the 
puzzle suggests that one could make it make sense—but that to do so will 
require looking at East St. Louis in a new light. Fortunately, this is not too 
hard: thanks not only to the physical proximity of St. Louis and East St. 
 
61 DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER & ROBERT FRENCH, TABLETOP, BATTLEOP, OB–PLATTE, 
POTELBAT, BELPATTO, PLATOBET, reprinted in DOUGLAS R. HOFSTADTER & THE FLUID 
ANALOGIES RESEARCH GRP., FLUID CONCEPTS AND CREATIVE ANALOGIES: COMPUTER 
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Louis but also to the sonoric proximity of their names, East St. Louis is on 
a certain conceptual level more attached to Missouri than to Illinois. This 
deep association between East St. Louis and Missouri hints that the puzzle 
makes some sense after all, and that we should begin our search for an 
answer by solving this subproblem: 
What is the St. Louis of Illinois? 
This is a piece of cake: Chicago, of course. The next step is to look for 
Chicago’s analogous sidekick—in other words, to attack this problem:  
What is the East St. Louis of Chicago? 
One’s first instinct might be to look within Illinois, but given the 
relationship between East St. Louis, St. Louis and the Mississippi River, it 
would perhaps seem better to look eastwards across the Chicago River into 
Indiana. This leads us . . . to Gary[, Indiana], which is not an awful answer. 
However, as a potential counterpart to East St. Louis, Gary is a bit hefty 
(their populations are roughly 50,000 and 150,000), and furthermore, the 
name “Gary” bears no relationship to that of the landmark city, Chicago. 
Consideration of these flaws suggests looking further, and fairly quickly, at 
least if one knows Chicago’s eastern suburbs reasonably well, one comes 
across another potential answer: East Chicago (population: roughly 40,000). 
This rather small and mostly black suburb of Chicago is, like East St. Louis, 
close to its landmark city in both location and name. It also lies east, across 
both the river and the state line from the landmark city. All this leaves little 
doubt that “the East St. Louis of Illinois” is East Chicago, Indiana. 
Of course, from a narrow and rigid point of view, East St. Louis itself 
ought to be the unhesitating answer, and no cities in Indiana should ever be 
considered at all. However, narrowness and rigidity are the antithesis of 
what analogy-making is all about, and in our opinion, East Chicago is a 
convincing and charming answer.62 
The answers suggested by analogy are not merely interesting, but have 
the power to constrain our actions. Hofstadter and French nicely illustrate 
this with the following example: 
International analogies are of great import and influence . . . . Consider, for 
instance, what happens when a conflict suddenly flares up in some 
unexpected portion of the world. As soon as this happens, every 
noninvolved country, no matter how far away, is forced to scrutinize the 
conflict for possible resemblances to its own situation, and then must take a 
stand according to any analogies perceived—and the stronger the analogy, 
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the more compelling the argument. If a country’s stance concerning another 
country’s behavior is inconsistent with its own behavior in an obviously 
analogous situation, it runs the risk of appearing hypocritical in the court of 
world opinion, and thus undermining the legitimacy of its own behavior. A 
sufficiently blatant analogy will override any other pressures, including 
prior ideological commitments. 
To make all this more concrete, take the case of Greece during the 
Falkland Islands conflict. One would think that this rather poor and 
backward third-world-leaning, socialist-oriented nation would have instantly 
sided with poor, backward, underdeveloped Argentina when the latter tried 
to reclaim the insignificant Islas malvinas, right off its coast, from the 
clutches of the rich, industrialized, right-wing, anachronistically colonial, 
and—most important of all—enormously distant nation of Great Britain. 
And yet no. The Greeks were in fact staunchly in solidarity with the British 
on this issue. Why? Because Greece’s position vis-à-vis the Falkland Islands 
conflict could hardly be determined without taking into account the 
blatantly obvious existence, to the world community, of “the Falkland 
Islands of Greece”—namely Cyprus, an island to which Greece lays claim 
but that is in fact much closer to another country (Turkey) that also claims 
sovereignty over it. Given this obvious analogy in the eyes of the world, 
how could Greece conceivably have sided with Argentina, no matter how 
much it would have liked to do so for other reasons? It had to side with 
Britain, because siding with Argentina over the Falklands would have been 
so analogous to siding with Turkey over Cyprus that doing so would have 
totally undermined whatever legitimacy Greece’s claims to Cyprus may 
have.63 
 To illustrate how analogy might come to the rescue in rendering 
determinate a seemingly indeterminate Kelman problem, consider the 
following problem associated with the Martin case. Martin, we noted, was 
charged with appearing in public and behaving badly.64 He defended on the 
ground that his violation of the statute did not meet the voluntariness 
requirement.65 One argument the prosecution could have raised was that 
although Martin’s appearance was not voluntary, the misconduct he 
subsequently engaged in certainly was voluntarily. The question then arose 
what to do in the case of a statute that prohibited the doing of A + B, when 
the defendant did B voluntarily but not A. Could one say he behaved 
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voluntarily because it was within his control whether the statute would be 
violated, or that he behaved involuntarily because some of what he is 
charged with doing he did not do voluntarily? Cases can be imagined 
illustrating each possibility. If the defendant were forcibly carried into his 
car and then proceeded to drive while drunk, he surely would not be able to 
defend on the ground that his appearance in the car was involuntary. On the 
other hand, if we imagine that a certain offense, say, child abuse, requires 
three instances of a certain type of misconduct—e.g., beating one’s child—
then the fact that one of these instances was carried out involuntarily 
probably would mean that it should not be counted, and the defendant 
could not be found guilty. Deciding what to do about Martin might then be 
guided by the question whether his case is more closely analogous to the 
first or the second of these imagined cases, the kind of question to which 
Hofstadter’s example suggests we will generally have rather precise 
responses.  
VI. TAKE 6: THE INCOMMENSURABILITY PERSPECTIVE 
I have to choose between two alternatives—a career in law (X) or in 
medicine (Y ). Suppose I cannot decide. Does that mean that I consider the 
two alternatives equally attractive? It might; but if it did, then if a career in 
medicine should prove ever so slightly more lucrative than it seemed when 
the two were in the balance, I should now immediately opt for medicine. 
That will ordinarily not be the case. This shows that my inability to decide 
does not show them to be equal, but incommensurate.  
Many difficult choices are difficult because they are like that. Famous 
tragic choices often have this flavor.  
A classic example is Jean-Paul Sartre’s. During the Second World War, one 
of Sartre’s students had to make a choice between staying in France to look 
after his mother, and leaving to join the Free French Forces in Britain. His 
mother very much needed him to stay, because his father had been revealed 
to be a traitor and his brother had been killed by the Nazis. Staying with 
her was a way to meet her needs. On the other hand, leaving for Britain was 
a way to promote the honour and freedom of France. The student was 
unable to weigh up determinately the values promoted by his two 
alternatives. The question ‘Which is better: to stay or to leave?’ seemed to 
him to have no right answer.66  
 
66 BROOME, supra note 55, at 165 (footnote omitted).  
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It should be clear that Sartre’s choices are therefore not equal. Because if 
they were, then, if his mother were to need him ever so slightly less, or if 
his effectiveness on behalf of the Free French were ever so slightly greater 
than it actually is, he should choose to leave his mother. And that seems 
implausible. 
Many people have argued that legal decisions involve choices among a 
plurality of values that create incommensurable alternatives.67 That may 
well be true, but it does not seem to describe the difficult cases that make 
up Kelman’s list. These do not seem to involve values that stand in the 
relationship of the above incommensurate alternatives. They seem difficult 
in a different way. 
VII. TAKE 7: THE IRRATIONALITY-OF-DISAGREEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
Several decades ago, the game theorist Robert Aumann proved a 
startling theorem demonstrating the inherent unreasonableness of agreeing 
to disagree.68 A good way to convey the gist of Aumann’s insight is with the 
help of an example from Ken Binmore’s game theory textbook.69 Imagine 
two hyper-rational detectives—Sherlock Holmes and Hercule Poirot—
investigating a murder.70 There are five suspects: A, B, C, D, and E.71 The 
detectives proceed independently of each other, interviewing suspects and 
witnesses and conducting whatever other forensic techniques they think 
appropriate, and each reaches a conclusion.72 As it happens, their 
conclusions differ.73 Let us imagine that Holmes thinks it 90% likely that A 
did it, 10% likely that B did, and virtually impossible that either C, D, or E 
was involved. Poirot thinks it 80% likely that B did it, and assigns a 5% 
probability to each of the remaining four. Does that mean that either 
Holmes or Poirot is being irrational? No, of course not.74 They started out 
with different priors; they have different lifetime experiences to fall back 
 
67 See generally, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 779 (1994) (analyzing views of incommensurability and its relation to choices). 
68 See Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, 4 ANNALS STAT. 1236, 1236 (1976) (“In brief, 
people with the same priors cannot agree to disagree.”).  
69 KEN BINMORE, PLAYING FOR REAL: A TEXT ON GAME THEORY (2007). 
70 Id. at 370.  
71 In Binmore’s actual example, there are three suspects. See id. (“One of Alice, Beatrice, and 
Carol is guilty of a crime.”).  
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id. at 370-71.  
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on; they use different techniques; and this is a difficult case.75 That can 
easily lead reasonable people to disagree in their conclusions.76  
What Aumann pointed out was that this only holds true as long as each 
person does not talk to the other.77 But what happens when they each share 
their conclusions with the other, and possibly the bases for these conclusions 
as well? What should we then expect their final conclusion to be? Aumann 
argues that if they are truly rational, they cannot be left disagreeing.78 What 
exactly they will agree on, we cannot say, given what we know of the facts so 
far—but Aumann believes that we can insist that they cannot reasonably 
disagree.79 How come?  
Each is able to reason thus: inasmuch as we are both equally rational, if I 
had been in the other’s shoes, I would have reached the conclusion he 
reached. That means that, in effect, each has undergone two different 
hypothetical experiences, one of which he knows leads him to one 
conclusion, the other of which leads him to a different conclusion. The final 
conclusion clearly needs to be one that synthesizes the upshot of the two 
paths. Both Holmes and Poirot will reason thus and thus will ultimately 
arrive at the same verdict. 
One could generalize from this to reach the conclusion that a 
determinate conclusion, even in this relatively indeterminate environment, 
is possible, provided that one includes among determinate conclusions one 
which gives only qualified endorsement to a variety of possibilities. But that 
is a notable degree of determinacy nonetheless, and could be carried over to 
Kelman’s cases.  
VIII. TAKE 8: THE SMALL WORLD/LARGE WORLD PERSPECTIVE 
In a wide-ranging discussion of decision theory, the game theorist Ken 
Binmore recently revived an old distinction, originally made by Leonard 
Savage, between what he calls “small world” decisions and “large world” 
decisions.80 Leonard Savage was one of the creators of the dominant model 
of decision theory currently in use.81 It is of course a highly sophisticated 
 
75 Id. at 370-72.  
76 Id.  
77 See Aumann, supra note 68, at 1236 (“The result is not true if we merely assume that the 
persons know each other’s posteriors.”).  
78 Id. 
79 Id.  
80 Ken Binmore, Rational Decisions in Large Worlds, 26 ANNALES D’ÉCONOMIE ET DE 
STATISTIQUE 25, 25-30 (2007).  
81 See generally LEONARD J. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (Dover Publ’ns 
1972) (1954).  
  
2015]  Nine Takes on Indeterminacy 1971 
 
model that captures a great deal about the way rational decisionmakers do 
and should proceed, in weighing alternatives, taking into account the 
information they now have, the information they may acquire in the future, 
and the desirability of various outcomes, as well as the probability 
distributions associated with them. Because Bayes’ theorem figures 
prominently in this model, this approach is often called Bayesian. Some 
theorists are so enamored of this model that they think that this is really all 
there is. By which they mean, this model describes what rational 
decisionmakers should be doing in every realm. Leonard Savage did not 
think so. The most severe limitation he saw the model to possess is that it 
had no room for surprise.82 In a Bayesian model, a decisionmaker starts out 
with certain prior assessments as to the likelihood of certain contingencies, 
as well as an elaborate contingency plan as to how he would revise his 
beliefs, and resulting actions, if certain other contingencies were to come to 
pass and make certain outcomes more or less probable. And that’s it. There 
is no room for surprise in this model, except in the very limited sense that it 
is a surprise when I roll a die and a four comes up rather than a five. I knew 
there were six possibilities. Whichever one the die produces is a surprise in 
the limited sense that I obviously could not foresee that it would. I only 
knew that there was a certain probability that it would. If all possible 
developments in the future are of this variety, then the Bayesian decision 
model fits it perfectly. But not all developments are of this variety. As 
Binmore observes, there are surprises.83 Bayesian decision theory guarantees 
that we will do the right thing in a world in which because of the lack of 
surprises, the optimal strategy is one in which we are logically consistent. 
But, as Binmore observes, 
[W]hy should a rational decision-maker wish to be consistent? After all, 
scientists are not consistent, on the grounds that it is not clever to be 
consistently wrong. When surprised by data that shows current theories to 
be in error, they seek new theories that are inconsistent with the old 
theories. Consistency, from this point of view, is only a virtue if the 
possibility of being surprised can somehow be eliminated. This is the reason 
for distinguishing large and small worlds. Only in the latter is consistency 
an unqualified virtue.84 
 
82 See id. at 43-50.  
83 Binmore, supra note 80, at 28.  
84 Id.  
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The world in which traditional decision theory works, the world without 
surprises, Binmore, following Leonard Savage, calls the “small world.”85 The 
“large world” is the real world, in which surprises are possible, in which 
scientific theories have to be chosen and all manner of other things have to 
be decided as to which the Bayesian decision theory model is no longer an 
appropriate model.86 But what is an appropriate model? We do not have it 
yet. Various models are under construction, but none has yet swept the 
field.87 
What is the point of this excursion about decision theory? What lawyers 
are looking for in explaining what courts do in so-called indeterminate cases 
is an explanation—a model of what happens when hard cases get decided. 
There is what really happens and there is of course what ought to happen. 
Ideally one would like to have a model that explains roughly what does 
happen and points the way to what ought to happen, a model that fulfills 
both a descriptive and a normative function. We will not have that until 
people who are experts in decision theory have come up with one. We legal 
scholars might help them because the law is a fertile source of suggestive 
examples. But it might be that until such a theory is found, no real light will 
be shed on the indeterminacy problem. 
IX. TAKE 9: THE RESIDUALIST PERSPECTIVE 
Cases get to judges because they are hard. If they were not hard—if a 
resolution were apparent to the parties—the parties would not wait for the 
judge’s decision. They would agree on what they foresee to be the judge’s 
decision. Predominantly, then, a judge has to decide a case where others fail 
to see a compelling, or maybe even just a halfway persuasive, way out. And 
he does decide, and writes an opinion justifying that decision. He is no 
smarter than the parties and will come up with nothing more than they 
came up with generally speaking. He will simply opt for one among the 
several resolutions, none of which the parties or the rest of the world 
viewed as more obviously right than the alternatives available. Nothing 
other than chance seems to determine his choice, because if something else 
did, the case would not have reached him. Moreover, the chance has to be of 
the Knightian uncertainty–type rather than the statistical risk–type, or 
predictability would have gotten into the act far enough for settlement once 
again to have likely preempted the judicial decision. Looked at in this way, 
 
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 40. 
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the process seems to be one that virtually guarantees that the judge’s 
decision is going to be indeterminate. 
CONCLUSION 
I have offered nine different perspectives on the problem of indeterminacy. 
As Albert Einstein said when a volume was published with several supposed 
refutations of relativity, “If I were wrong, one would have been enough.”88 If 
I thought that any of these nine takes truly resolved the problem, I would 
rest content with that. But while I think they offer some illumination, for 
the most part they vindicate my sense that this is a really hard problem. 
 
 
88 KAREN C. FOX & ARIES KECK, EINSTEIN A TO Z 187 (2004).  
